Expert regarding the IHF: "You’re not looking at democratic governance – you’re looking at political engineering"

The IHF election is almost here. In GoHandball’s interview with Chris Rasmussen, integrity and governance expert, he dissects the structural flaws that shape power inside the IHF: concentrated authority, opaque processes, inactive members with full voting rights, and oversight bodies unable to hold leadership accountable. He argues that these elements don’t just weaken governance – they create a system built to be controlled.
“You’re not looking at democratic governance — you’re looking at political engineering,” says Rasmussen.

Chris Rasmussen is a lecturer at the University of New Haven specialising in sports betting integrity, and Head of Financial Crime and Compliance in Denmark at Advisense. With extensive experience analysing governance, compliance structures and integrity risks across international sport, he provides an independent, research-grounded perspective on the systemic vulnerabilities shaping global federations, such as the IHF.

This interview was conducted ahead of the IHF Congress on 19-22 December, where member nations will vote on a new president and several key leadership positions.

From your perspective, what are the main structural weaknesses you see in international federations like the IHF?

“If you look across international sport, you see the same governance weaknesses repeated and again. Handball is not unique in that sense. The first weakness is highly centralised presidential power with very few counterbalances. Transparency International warned in its Global Corruption Report: Sport that international federations with “strong presidents and weak oversight bodies” face significantly elevated corruption risks. And that pattern is visible in many Olympic and non-Olympic sports.

When too much authority sits with one office – appointments, funding decisions, event allocation — it creates a structural dependency. People start aligning with the president rather than with good governance.

The second weakness is opaque decision-making around finances, development funding and tournaments. The ASOIF Governance Review has repeatedly found that many federations lack transparent criteria for awarding events or allocating funds, leading to decisions that often appear discretionary rather than evidence-based. In governance terms, opacity is not just a transparency problem — it is a vulnerability. When nobody can see the rationale behind decisions, political loyalty becomes a more powerful currency than performance.

The third weakness is uneven member development combined with equal voting rights.
Some members are well-functioning federations with leagues, youth systems and compliance structures. Others, as research from Play the Game has pointed out, are effectively “one-person offices” with no domestic activity but full voting power. This creates what scholars call a ‘representative imbalance’ — where federations that contribute the least to the sport can have the same influence as those carrying most of the financial, developmental and integrity burdens.

Finally, there is the issue of limited independent oversight. The Council of Europe and IPACS have emphasised that ethics bodies must be structurally independent from leadership to be effective. In many sports, that independence is either weak or nominal. When the same leadership appoints oversight committees, they may one day have to investigate. The system isn’t designed for accountability — it’s designed for stability.

All of these weaknesses matter because they create an environment where loyalty can outweigh integrity, and where short-term political interests can overshadow long-term development. As an integrity practitioner, I don’t look at personalities — I look at structure. And structurally, any federation with concentrated power, opaque processes and inactive members holding full voting rights is operating with built-in governance risks.

How vulnerable are sports with centralised presidential power to governance failure?

“Sports with highly centralised presidential systems are inherently more vulnerable. That’s not my opinion, that’s well-documented governance research.” Transparency International notes that “concentrated authority without counterbalancing structures is a primary predictor of governance failure in sport.”

And the OECD, through the IPACS initiative, warns that federations without a separation of powers face a higher risk of conflicts of interest and political capture. “When one office controls appointments, funding and strategic direction, the system becomes dependent on the integrity of one individual rather than the strength of the institution. That’s fragile by definition.”

The IHF has admitted eight new member nations since 2016 – several with little visible handball activity. What do you make of this pattern?

“If a federation expands membership without requiring demonstrable activity, it raises governance questions. Growth is positive, but only if it reflects real development. Play the Game’s governance analysts have repeatedly identified this pattern – new members with minimal infrastructure admitted before elections.

Sporting development should be the driver. But when activity is close to zero, you naturally ask whether politics, rather than handball, is the underlying motivation.”

Is it common for long-standing presidents to expand membership strategically to consolidate support?

“Yes, it’s a well-known phenomenon in international sport. We’ve seen it in volleyball, weightlifting, boxing you name it. Transparency International has described this as “vote engineering through membership inflation.” It’s not illegal, but it fundamentally reshapes the political landscape. When new members depend heavily on the president for recognition or resources, the political arithmetic becomes very predictable.”

Should there be higher entry criteria for membership?

“Absolutely. This is basic governance. The Council of Europe recommends that federations require their members to meet minimum governance standards: statutes, democratic elections, financial reporting, and sporting activity.

If you want a vote in a global federation, there should be a minimum threshold of legitimacy: a functioning federation, a league, youth activity — something verifiable.”

More than 100 IHF member nations have no website, no ranking, and no verifiable activity. How concerning is this?

“If that number is accurate, it’s extremely concerning. You cannot run a credible global federation when half your members are essentially invisible. The ASOIF Governance Review identifies active communication and basic transparency as baseline criteria for federations.

If you can’t verify activity, contact leadership or confirm competitions, those aren’t active members – they’re political entities. And that undermines legitimacy.”

How common is the phenomenon of “ghost federations” being used to maintain political control?

“It’s uncomfortable, but yes – ghost federations are a known governance risk. Play the Game and Transparency International have documented multiple cases where “paper members” influence elections despite lacking domestic sport.

This is the sporting equivalent of gerrymandering. If votes come from organisations that don’t actually run the sport, you’re not looking at democratic governance – you’re looking at political engineering.”

What are the risks when nations with little or no handball infrastructure hold the same voting power as fully functioning federations?

“The risk is misalignment. The federations investing in competitions, safeguarding, refereeing, youth development – they’re carrying the weight of the sport. But their influence is equal to actors that may not even run a league. Geeraert’s governance research calls this representational asymmetry, in which voting power does not correlate with contributions or accountability. That’s a structural weakness. It allows political blocs to veto reforms that would actually strengthen the sport.”

Could this environment allow for vote-buying or bloc politics? What are the classic warning signs?

“When you combine opaque funding, many small dependent members, and long-term leadership, the risk of bloc voting increases.

Transparency International flags several warning signs:

1: Rapid membership growth before elections
2: Development money clustering around particular regions
3: Lack of published criteria for financial support
4: Delegates attending only during election cycles

If you see those patterns, it doesn’t automatically mean wrongdoing – but it does signal a system vulnerable to undue influence.”

Insiders say it is extremely difficult to be classified as ‘non-active’ – that simple contact with IHF is enough. What does this tell you?

“It suggests the system prioritises maintaining a large membership over safeguarding its quality. The Council of Europe stresses that activity criteria must be objective and measurable – contact alone is not governance. If sending an email qualifies you as an active federation, it tells me the accountability structures are designed to keep members in, not to uphold standards.”

Should international sports bodies introduce stricter or more transparent standards for determining activity or voting eligibility?

“Yes – and many already do. World Athletics and World Rugby have introduced tiered membership systems. IPACS recommends that voting rights be tied to transparent, independently verifiable activity metrics. This doesn’t have to be punitive. You can maintain membership while suspending voting rights until basic governance and activity criteria are met.”

Several nations voting also have candidates running for IHF positions. How problematic is this conflict of interest?

“This is a textbook conflict-of-interest scenario. The IOC Ethics Code states that actors must avoid situations in which personal interests can influence institutional decisions.

Of course, federations will support their own candidates – that’s natural. What’s problematic is the absence of independent oversight to ensure votes aren’t traded for positions or favours.”

We attempted to contact all 211 federations with almost no success. How concerning is it for a global federation when so many members cannot be reached?

“If that’s the real picture, it’s a governance crisis.

A federation cannot claim global representation when a substantial portion of its membership is unreachable. From an integrity standpoint, if you cannot contact members, you cannot monitor development, safeguarding, financial compliance, or even basic governance. It means the federation’s map and the reality on the ground are two very different things.”

Should unresponsive or inactive federations be allowed full voting rights in a presidential election?

“From a governance perspective – no. Voting rights should be earned, not simply inherited. Transparency International advocates linking voting rights to minimum compliance obligations: reporting, elections, financial statements, and evidence of activity.

If you’re unreachable, unaccountable, and inactive for years, it’s hard to justify why you should decide the leadership of a global sport.”

Is the IHF an outlier, or do many sports federations rely on small or inactive members to maintain political stability?

“The pattern is widespread. It has been documented in football, weightlifting, volleyball, boxing and others. The question is not whether the practice exists – it does – but to what extent.

What varies is how extreme the imbalance is. Some federations are reforming; others still rely heavily on small or inactive members as political insurance.”

The IHF president has been in power for more than 20 years. What does research say about risks of long-term leadership?

“Research is very clear: long tenures correlate with increased governance risk.

Geeraert’s empirical studies show that presidential terms beyond 12–16 years significantly increase the likelihood of entrenched patronage networks. Transparency International warns that “leaders who become institutions unto themselves” can reshape governance structures to prevent change.

It’s not about the individual; it’s about institutional fragility. No healthy governance system should depend on one person for decades.”

Should federations be required to disclose their vote publicly in presidential elections?

“Public voting increases accountability, but it can also expose smaller federations to pressure. So the system needs balance. Some sports use a hybrid model: votes are secret internationally but must be disclosed domestically to their members or athletes. The principle should be that decisions of this magnitude are traceable. Total opacity benefits only those who already hold power.”

Is there anything about the IHF structure, culture, or political landscape that particularly worries you from an integrity standpoint?

“What worries me is the combination — not one single element.

You have:

1: Long-term leadership
2: Equal voting rights regardless of activity
3: Expansion patterns that mirror political consolidation
4: Limited transparency
5: Many unreachable or inactive members
6: Weak activity criteria

Each of these issues on its own is manageable. Together, they form exactly the governance risk profile that Transparency International, the Council of Europe and IPACS have warned about for a decade.

From an integrity perspective, the structure appears highly vulnerable to political capture and resistant to reform,” says Chris Rasmussen.

Appendix to answers

Volleyball – FIVB (Rubén Acosta, 1984–2008: 24 years)

Rubén Acosta’s presidency of the FIVB (International Volleyball Federation) lasted 24 years and is one of the most widely cited cases in sport governance research.

Multiple academic analyses (Chappelet, Geeraert, Play the Game) reference the Acosta era as a period characterised by centralised presidential power, limited transparency, and tight political control.
Acosta’s administration was repeatedly criticised for opaque finances and the use of presidential authority to maintain a loyal voting bloc among smaller federations.

Boxing – AIBA/IBA (C. K. Wu, 2006–2017 and historical patterns before him)

While C.K. Wu served 11 years (2006–2017), the larger pattern in Olympic boxing governance goes back further:

the IOC and independent investigators have described AIBA (now IBA) as suffering from decades of “systemic governance issues”, including financial mismanagement, political influence, and opaque elections.
Before Wu, Anwar Chowdhry had been in leadership roles for 20+ years, including over a decade as president (1986–2006).
Both eras saw complaints of political bloc-building and weak oversight — ultimately leading to AIBA being suspended by the IOC from organising Olympic boxing due to governance failures.

Weightlifting – IWF (Tamás Aján, 2000–2020: 20 years as President, 44 years in leadership)

The International Weightlifting Federation (IWF) is perhaps the strongest example in modern sport:

Tamás Aján served 20 years as President and 44 years in total leadership roles (starting as Secretary-General in the 1970s).
In 2020, an independent investigation (McLaren Report) found evidence of financial misconduct, vote-buying, hidden doping cases, and the use of small, politically loyal federations to maintain control.
The report found that Aján “retained control through patronage, opaque finances and manipulation of voting structures.”

Expert regarding the IHF: “You’re not looking at democratic governance – you’re looking at political engineering”

Appendix to answers

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